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A reflection on the role of community forest user groups to enable 
vulnerable communities to adapt to climate change in Nepal 
 





In Nepal, community forest user groups (CFUGs) as local institutions have 
demonstrated appropriate institutional arrangements to manage forest resources as 
commons. The characteristics, functions and roles of CFUGs required to manage 
commons are well studied and have been translated into practice. Less is known 
about the role of CFUGs, as local institutions, in managing local adaptation to climate 
change and climate variability, particularly the key characteristics and functions 
required to support vulnerable communities.  Case study research on the issues of 
development of adaptation strategies by CFUGs and villagers of differing well-being 
groups in the mountains of Nepal is reported through qualitative and quantitative 
research methods.    
 
This research examines the role and potential of CFUGs as key local institution to 
enable vulnerable communities, individually or as a collective to promote actions for 
climate change adaptation in the rural hills of Nepal. Of interest are the mandates, 
roles, functions and capacity of CFUGs required to facilitate climate change 
adaptation to assist the most vulnerable communities. The research identifies that 
improved governance, enhanced capacity, knowledge and skills in mediating 
external services, and support mechanisms in knowledge and information are key 
factors to optimize the role of CFUGs in adaptation to climate change. More 
importantly, the research suggests that the success of CFUGs to assist the most 
vulnerable in communities depends largely on institutional ability to transform 
organizational policies, structure and practices, and delegate authority and power. 
These actions are pathways to build trust, empower, engage and allow the most 
vulnerable populations to use their rights to an equitable share of the productivity of 
the commons. 
 
Key words: Local institutions, community forest user groups, collective actions, 




The role of local institutions in managing common pool resources has been a topic of 
research interest since the 1980s (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990, 2010).  Studies on 
the use and distribution of resources of the commons indicate that local resource 
users develop institutional arrangements to collectively manage resources such as 
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forests, fisheries, grazing lands and water systems and share benefits derived from 
resource management (Agrawal et al. 2013; Agrawal and Yadama 1997; Baland and 
Platteau 1996; Kellert et al. 2000; Ostrom 1992; Pretty and Ward 2001). Studies 
have also revealed that ineffective institutional arrangements can result in under or 
over exploitation of common pool resources (Clark 1973; Larson and Bromley 1990). 
Ostrom (2005) has shown that resource dependent communities often develop 
institutional rules to define their resource boundaries, user rights, resource allocation 
rules, monitoring arrangements, and conflict resolution mechanisms to regulate and 
manage common pool resources.  
 
Resource dependent communities are historically experienced in managing weather-
dependent natural resources and have developed various adaptation practices to 
reduce their risks and vulnerabilities (Adger 2003; Agrawal 2001; Alexander et al. 
2010). However, coping and adaptation strategies applied by local communities may 
not be adequate due to lack of information, knowledge and resources in the face of 
increasing climate change induced vulnerabilities of livelihoods of resource 
dependent communities. Climate change has implications for natural resource based 
livelihoods and the projected risks are more profound where livelihoods of 
communities are primarily dependent on weather sensitive natural resources (IISD 
2003; Paavola and Adger 2002; Smit et al. 2007). The roles of local institutions thus 
become more important in responding to the impacts of climate change and in 
supporting local communities to enhance their adaptive capacity at individual, 
household and community levels (Agrawal 2010; Ostrom 2010). According to Adger 
(2003), adaptation is a dynamic social process and the ability of societies to adapt is 
determined, in part, by the ability to act collectively. Adger (1999) differentiates 
individual and collective vulnerabilities with their causes and indicators, listing the 
causes of individual vulnerability as relative and absolute poverty, entitlement failure 
and resource dependency; and of collective vulnerability as infrastructure 
development, institutional and political factors, insurance and formal and informal 
social security. 
 
The role of local institutions has been considered very important in climate change 
adaptation as local institutions can influence the distribution of climate risk by 
organizing incentives for household and community level adaptations, and by 
mediating external interventions suited to the local context (Agrawal 2010). Local 
institutions contribute to communities’ ability to cope with the risks of climate change 
by facilitating and managing the interactions between social and natural capital 
(Adger et al. 2003; Pretty and Ward 2001). There are many examples of rural 
communities that have acted to enhance their adaptive capacity and organized 
collectively to manage climate risks using local institutions in the form of social 
networks, capital, norms and traditions (Adger 2003; Pelling and High 2005; Rodima-
Taylor et al. 2011). Adger (2003) has shown that collective actions such as the 
formation and functioning of social networks are linked with adaptive capacity as 
collective actions can mediate collective risks in the face of climate change. 
 
The role of local institutions in Nepal has been well recognized in the literature 
because of their active role in managing the country’s most important natural 
resources such as forests and water as common pool resources (Adhikari and Di 
Falco 2009; Lim et al. 2005; Ostrom 1990). Local institutions such as CFUGs and 
irrigation groups have been recognized for their potential roles in the implementation 
3 
 
of adaptation plans at the local level (MoE 2010; Pokharel and Byrne 2009). One of 
the most widespread and well-established local institutions in rural Nepal are 
CFUGs. There are currently over 17,500 CFUGs as local institutions managing 
approximately 1.65 million ha of community forests (out of total 5.8 million ha) 
mobilizing 2.1 million households (about 40% of total and over 60% of rural 
population) in Nepal (DoF 2011). The CFUGs have a progressive mandate and 
would appear to have the potential to contribute to climate change adaptation by 
providing ecological goods and services, socio-economic benefits and a ‘safety net’ 
for poor people (Pokharel and Byrne 2009).  
 
The role, capacity and functions of CFUGs in Nepal that would enable vulnerable 
communities to adapt to climate change are not fully understood. There are also 
limitations and concerns about the role and commitment of these institutions in 
addressing contemporary issues related to governance (such as equity, 
transparency, inclusion and participation), gender and poverty (Gentle et al. 2007; 
Kanel 2008; Nightingale 2002; Paudel et al. 2010; Thoms 2008). Rural poor who 
depend on natural resources are considered the most vulnerable to climate change 
impacts (Agrawal and Perrin 2008; IPCC 2007; Paavola and Adger 2006). Thus 
there is a strong need and justification to support poor and vulnerable communities 
to improve livelihoods and enhance their adaptive capacity (Gentle and Maraseni 
2012; Moser 2010; Vernon 2008). However, it is questionable whether the CFUGs, 
often dominated and controlled by local elites (e.g. well-off, upper caste, men), are 
prepared to support poor and vulnerable communities in providing measures to 
adapt to climate change.   
 
Based on these understandings of the roles and capacities, the research reflects on 
the roles, functions and characteristics of CFUGs in the context of climate change 
adaptation. Moreover, the research considers changes to CFUGs that may enhance 
their effectiveness in supporting the most vulnerable communities for climate change 
adaptation. The following sections present a theoretical background of institutions 
and their role in the context of climate change, a description of the research site and 
methodology applied, key results, discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION 
 
2.1 Institutions and institutional theories 
 
Discussion of ‘institutions’ emerged in the social and political sphere in the eighties 
mostly to define and explain formal institutions. North (1994, 360) defined institutions 
as “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up 
of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., 
norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their 
enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies 
and specifically economies”. Similarly, Bromley (1989, 22) defined institutions as 
“rules and conventions of society that facilitate coordination among people regarding 
their behaviour”. Institutions can be formal or informal and exist at multiple scales of 
human organization. Collective management of environmental goods and services 
as common pool resources requires institutions in the form of rules, structures, 




The term “institution” covers a broad range of social structures including public, civic 
and private sector and at different scales such as local and national (Agrawal and 
Perrin 2008; Uphoff et al. 2006). Public institutions include government agencies with 
legal authority that can impose penalties or sanctions backed by governmental 
powers of enforcement. Civic institutions are membership based cooperatives or 
volunteer organizations whose actions are to  serve the common interest of their 
members in areas such as  pooling and mobilizing products, access to capital, labour 
needs and other factors of production.  Private institutions can include both profit and 
non-profit based organizations such as charities, trusts, foundations and market 
organizations.  
 
2.2 Local institutions and collective actions 
 
Scott and Marshall (2009) define collective action as an ‘‘action taken by a group 
(either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ 
perceived shared interests’’. Collective actions are volunteer actions such as 
collective decision-making, setting rules to conduct and manage a group, 
implementing decisions, and monitoring adherence to rules (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
2004). According to Poteete and Ostrom (2004) collective actions emerge and grow 
in the forms of formation and development of institutions, mobilization of resources, 
co-ordinate activities and information sharing.  
 
Collective actions occur through involvement of a group of people with a shared 
interest and generally involve common action driven by shared interest (Meinzen-
Dick and Di Gregorio 2004). Collective action enhances coordination, organization, 
and mobilization of individuals and groups to achieve a common goal and produce 
collective and effective outcomes (Ostrom 1990). Collective actions also occur in 
instances of state and market failures, particularly in meeting the needs of the poor 
in agricultural and rural development (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). In Nepal, evidence 
of collective actions is observed through various group activities and programs such 
as forest user groups, microfinance groups, watershed management programs, 
integrated pest management, participatory breeding and farmer-managed irrigation 
systems.  
 
2.3 Effectiveness of local institutions in managing commons 
 
Environmental and resource regimes provide examples of common institutions that 
can regulate actions against environmental degradation either through restriction on 
over-exploitation of resources or reducing unintended side effects of resource 
exploitation (Young 2010). The characteristics, functions and roles of common pool 
resource management institutions related to irrigation, forestry, fisheries and 
pastures have been widely studied. The concepts and practices of self organization 
amongst resource users under particular institutional arrangements have been well 
established (Cox et al. 2010; Feeny et al. 1990).  Most of the studies, innovations 
and criticisms are based on theories and principles such as:  
 
i) institutional rules (Ostrom 1986, 1990);  
ii) underlying factors for effectiveness of collective action (Wade 1988);  
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iii) design principles for long-enduring and robust institution (Ostrom 1990); 
and  
iv) facilitating conditions for collective action (Baland and Platteau 1996). 
 
The effectiveness of local institutions has been examined in common pool 
management systems. Andersson and Agrawal (2011), examining the relationship 
between socio-economic inequalities and ecological sustainability related to forest 
commons, found that socio-economic inequalities had negative effects in forest 
outcomes; however, such inequalities were found to be significantly reduced where 
local institutions were effectively functioning with collective actions. Lam (1998), in a 
comparative study of farmer and government-managed irrigation systems in Nepal, 
concluded that farmer-managed irrigation systems were performing better than the 
government- managed irrigation systems in terms of better ownership, well 
established and accepted local rules, and equity in benefit sharing. These examples 
well demonstrate the effectiveness of local commons in managing local resources. 
 
2.4 Capacity of local institutions in managing climate change adaptation 
 
According to Agrawal and Perrin (2008) climate change adaptation is a local 
process, and its effectiveness depends on local and external institutions through 
which incentives for individual and collective actions are defined. This is because 
“institutional arrangements structure risks and sensitivity to climate hazards, facilitate 
or impede individual and collective responses, and shape the outcomes of such 
responses” (Agrawal and Perrin 2008, 8). Institutions play important roles in  
influencing livelihoods and adaptations of rural communities in three different ways 
as: (i) institutions structure the distribution of climate risks and impacts; (ii) 
institutions constitute and organize the incentive structures for household and 
community level adaptations for their adaptation responses; and (iii) institutions 
mediate external interventions into local contexts which ultimately unfold the 
adaptation by articulating social and political process (Agrawal and Perrin 2008).  
 
There are many examples where rural communities have enhanced adaptive 
capacity and collectively organized to manage climate risks using their local 
institutions in the form of social networks, capital, norms and traditions (Pelling and 
High 2005; Rodima-Taylor et al. 2011). The formation and functioning of social 
networks are linked with adaptive capacity of the socio-ecological system because 
collective actions can mediate collective risks and enhance adaptive capacity to 
climate change (Adger 2003). Studies by Adger (2000) and Agrawal (2008) have 
highlighted the potential for rural institutions to strengthen the adaptive capacity and 
facilitate adaptation to climate change at the local level. Based on studies conducted 
in Mexico, Eakin (2005) argues farmers’ sensitivity to climatic impacts and their 
capacity to manage climatic risk mainly depends on how they organize their 
livelihoods in confronting institutional change. Robledo et al., (2004) have shown 
how community organizations in hill communities in Bolivia remained successful in 
developing adaptation strategies and building resilience through ecosystem 
management and restoration activities including rehabilitation of watersheds, agro-
ecology, and forest landscape.  Moser (1996) and Narayan-Parker (1997) have 
argued that communities associated with social networks and civic associations are 








2.5 Limitations of CFUGs in managing common pool resources 
 
The inclusion and participation of marginalized community members such as poor, 
women and Dalits2 and their access to equitable benefit sharing from common pool 
resource management in Nepal is questioned and criticized by several authors 
(Acharya and Gentle 2005; Adhikari and Di Falco 2009; Hughes 1993; Kanel 2008; 
Tiwary 2006). The patriarchal social structure and historically constructed power 
relations were found to be a major cause for exclusion of women in collective actions 
in South Asia (Agarwal 2010). Adhikari and Di Falco (2009) explored the role of 
social heterogeneity in the participation of households in decision making positions in 
community forestry (CF) in Nepal, finding that, members of households belonging to 
lower-caste groups had a lower probability of being elected as members of the 
executive committee of user groups. Poverty and powerlessness in Nepal historically 
depends on caste, gender, ethnicity and geographical location of people (Bennett et 
al. 2006; CBS 2011). The issues related to inequality and discrimination, non-
participation, disempowerment, and lack of accountability are also considered to 
diminish core human rights (Evans 2009).  
 
The disparity in socio-economic outcomes of community forestry has been analyzed 
in a study of 1,788 CFUGs from 12 middle hill and Terai districts of Nepal (Kanel 
2004). The study found that the total annual income of CFUGs in Nepal in 2004 was 
about 10 million USD, however, only about 3% of this went to specifically pro-poor 
investments, in comparisons to expenditures in other areas such as community 
development (36%), forest development (28%), miscellaneous (17%) and CFUG 
operational expenses (14%). Another study of eight CFUGs in Nepal revealed that 
the economic activities or commercialization of community forestry was not pro-poor 
with unequal distribution of the funds among community households (Paudel et al. 
2010). Studies by Paudel et al., (2006) and Paudel et al., (2010) also confirmed that 
association between CFUG members, contractors and forestry officials promoted 
and institutionalized corruption in the CFUGs following commercialization of forest 
products. Corruption is common in Nepal as the country has been ranked at 139th 
position in the Transparency International global corruption index (TI, 2012). 
Realizing these socio-economic disparities and equity issues, the community forestry 
guideline was revised in 2009 (GoN 2009) including provisions for participation, 
decision making and benefit sharing to assist  pro-poor affirmative actions.   
 
3. RESEARCH LOCATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research location 
 
Case study research was conducted in the Lamjung district of Nepal. The district is 
located in the middle hills region of western Nepal. The population of the district in 
2011 was 169,104 in 44,068 households (GoN 2012). The district is representative 
                                                 
2




of the middle hill region of Nepal where over two thirds of the population of the 
district depends on subsistence agriculture with a strong linkage between farming, 
pasture lands and forestry. The district is ranked as one of the very high climate 
change vulnerable districts in Nepal based on high vulnerabilities due to landslides 
and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) (MoE 2010). The population of the district is 
diverse in terms of caste (including Dalit and other castes), culture and indigenous 
ethnic identity (such as Gurung, Magar, and Tamang). Table 1 presents a description 
of CFUGs selected for case study. 
 
Table 1 Description of CFUGs selected for research 
 
Source: DFO and CFUG records 
 
The forests in this district complement agricultural practices by providing forest 
products, grazing land, environmental services to stabilize land, and to regulate 
water resources (DFO 2012). Approximately 39% of the total area of the district is 
covered by forests (total area = 170,781.6 ha) and about 19,319 ha forest area of the 
district has been handed over to 24,904 households affiliated with 304 CFUGs as a 
community forest (DFO 2012). The remainder of the forests in the district is either 
managed by the government or by the Annapurna Conservation Area Project. The 
research was conducted in four village development committees (VDCs) of the 
district, two from downstream (altitude below 500 m) and two from upstream region 
with altitude above 1000 m along the Marsyangdi River. Four CFUGs were selected 
as research sites representing one each from selected VDCs.  
 
3.2 Research methods  
 
The research followed a mixed method approach based on pragmatism using an 
interpretivist perspective (Johnson et al. 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). The 
inductive theory followed by a deductive theory was combined considering qualitative 
methods as dominant and quantitative methods as complementary methods of data 
collection (Creswell 1994; McMurray et al. 2004). Qualitative methods provided the 
primary data collection techniques, including in-depth interviews (n=62 community 
and district level interviewees), focus group discussions (FGDs) (n=11 events and 
117 participants from community level) and participant observations. Complementary 
quantitative data was gathered through a household level survey (n=133 community 
level respondents). Participatory well-being ranking was conducted in all research 
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> 1,000  120 97.80 2003 
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sites to categorize the research population into four well-being strata (well-off, 
medium, poor and very poor) based on relative well-being position of households in 
the community using local criteria of well-being (Mosse 1994). Survey respondents 
and interviewees were selected representing all well-being groups using stratified 
random sampling process. Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS 17 and the 
qualitative data was analyzed through a thematic hierarchical approach using NViVO 
9.  
 
4. RESULTS  
 
4.1 CFUGs and their contribution in climate change adaptation 
 
The research participants (interviewees, household survey respondents and 
participants of FGDs) recognized the current role and potential of CFUGs in climate 
change adaptation. The CFUGs function in coordination with various formal and 
informal local institutions, within the state, civil society and private sectors. Although, 
the plans and activities of the CFUGs had no explicit provisions for climate change 
adaptation, research participants recognized the useful contribution in enabling 
communities in climate change adaptation. The existing knowledge, capacity and 
experience of all CFUGs was very low in designing and implementing climate 
change related activities and in addressing the needs of local community for climate 
change adaptation initiatives. The role and mandate of CFUGs was not explicitly 
identified in written policies, however these institutions were willing to enhance their 
understanding of climate change and implement adaptation activities to reduce 
vulnerability.  
 
Almost all research participants in the communities had an association with CFUGs. 
The CFUGs had well established networks with locally governed rules, norms and 
values to mobilize local communities and manage common pool resources. The 
major roles and functions of the CFUGs to support local communities in climate 
change adaptation were highlighted as: (i) income and employment generation; (ii) 
protecting and managing forest commons; (iii) supply of forest products and 
contribution in rural livelihoods; (iv) environmental services such as protection and 
conservation of soil and water resources; (v) income and economic services; (vi) 
contribution in infrastructure development and community development activities; 
(vii) pro-poor investment and contribution in poverty reduction; (viii) livestock grazing 
(ix) awareness raising, capacity building and leveraging social capital, and (x) 



































Figure 1 Ongoing contribution of CFUGs in climate change adaptation and rural 
livelihoods (Source: Interview and FGD transcriptions) 
 
4.2 Outreach of CFUGs to vulnerable communities 
 
Participants recognized the important role of CFUGs as local institutions in 
mobilizing large number of community members and managing common pool 
resources according to locally governed rules. Analysis was carried out of their role, 
capacity and willingness to support the most vulnerable communities, exploring 
aspects such as membership, decision making, benefit sharing, implementation of 
governance related provisions, mediation of external services and benefits, and 
satisfaction of communities towards the CFUGs.   
 
For the purposes of this analysis, the communities most vulnerable to climate 
change impacts are considered to be those who are poor in terms of their well-being 
status and belong to so called lower caste in terms of their social status; and those 
living in vulnerable locations prone to landslide and gullies and scarcity of water 
(research by the authors, paper in prep.). 
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Participants reported that the membership of CFUGs was open to all communities 
living close to the forests and traditionally depending on forest resources. However, 
membership in some CFUGs was restricted to certain caste groups and to the 
recently migrated members. One of the major forms of exclusion in CFUG 
membership was based on traditional use rights and tenure claimed by certain caste 
groups. As explained by the participants of FGD: 
 “the forest area of Chisapani CFUG was historically under the control of certain 
upper caste groups. However, following the private forest nationalization policy 
of the government the forest became public property and the land measurement 
in 1986 declared the forest as public property. The forest was then handed over 
to the local community as a community forest in 2005. However, the local elites 
from dominant caste groups decided to provide membership of the CFUG only 
to upper caste groups assuming the forest as their ancestral property. The 
forest was officially handed over to the upper caste groups and the Dalits who 
were also traditionally residing in the same community were excluded from their 
membership and user rights. The Dalit communities continuously claimed their 
user rights as per the provisions of community forestry. Government officials 
also argued that the membership of community forest should be provided to all 
households living close to the forests. After some years the community forest 
management committee decided to provide membership to excluded 
households but they asked 4,000 Rs from each household as membership fees. 
Some households paid this amount to become a member but some households 
who couldn’t afford this amount are still excluded. The money collected as 
membership fees were distributed among upper caste households rather than 
depositing it in CFUG account. The decision making of this forest is still 
controlled by local elites and decisions are not transparent to other members”.  
 
A poor interviewee from Raniswanra CFUG claimed that she was compelled to pay a 
high membership fees while receiving a new membership of Raniswanra CFUG 
when she migrated in a village close to the community forest. As she described 
“community forest user group is collecting money from new members. The 
membership fee for new members is 10,000 Rs. This amount is very high for poor 
members.” As reported, many very poor and poor households were not able to get 
membership because of high membership fees. The stories explain how traditional 
and feudal legacy has been transferred to local institutions and how local elites use 
their caste and wealth based power to exclude powerless communities from their 
access to membership. As reported by the research participants similar practices 
exist in many CFUGs in the district. 
 
4.2.2 Decision making  
 
The household survey data revealed that in 30% of respondent households (total 
133) at least one member was in a decision making positions of local institutions. 
However, participation in decision making positions was varied according to well-
being status of the respondents. As reported, 77 % well-off and 24% medium 
respondents had at least one household member in decision making positions of 
these institutions. While, none of the poor and very poor households were in the 
decision making position of those institutions. The Pearson’s chi-square test 
indicated that there was a significant relationship between participation of 
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respondents in the decision making positions of institutions with their well-being 
status (X2 = 54.5958, df = 3, p-value =0). However, participation of respondents in 
decision making positions of local institutions had no significant association with 
gender of household head or according to case study site. 
 
Similarly, an analysis of executive committees of the four case study CFUGs, 
revealed that the participation of well-off, medium, poor and very poor well-being 
groups in the committees in 2012 was 47%, 39%, 11%, and 3% respectively (Table 
2). Out of 16 members in the key positions of executive committee, 56% were well-
off and 44% were medium, whereas, there was no representation of poor and very 
poor households in the key decision making positions such as chairperson, vice 
chairperson, secretary and treasurer (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Participation of different well-being groups in the decision making positions 
of CFUGs 
Source: CFUG records 
 
Two examples presented above confirm that the decision making of local institutions 
is controlled by local elites based on their well-being status and traditionally gained 
power. The decision making authority of these institutions indicates who makes local 
rules (and thus holds power and influence), and how these rules affect the members, 
as seen in the following sections. 
 
4.2.3 Benefit sharing 
 
Benefit sharing practices of local institutions was analyzed using contribution of 
CFUGs in implementing pro-poor provisions. The implementation of pro-poor 
provisions mentioned in the revised community forestry guideline was considered as 
crucial to increase the adaptive capacity of poor and vulnerable communities. The 
guidelines included mandatory provisions to be carried out by all CFUGs as: i) well-
being ranking of CFUG households according to their relative well-being; ii) 
preparation and implementation of livelihood improvement plan for poor households; 
iii) allocation of part of the CF land for income generating activities; and iv) allocation 
of at least 35% of CFUGs’ income for pro-poor activities. However, an assessment of 
the implementation status of pro-poor provisions as per the provision of revised CF 
guidelines revealed that the CFUGs were not following most of the provisions. 
Although the CFUGs had carried out well-being ranking and mentioned the 
outcomes in the constitutions or forest operational plans, the ranking was not used in 
deciding benefit sharing provisions (Table 3).  






of CFUGs  
Committee 
members 
Key positions (Chairperson, 
vice chair person, secretary 
and treasurer) in the 
committee 
Well-off 122 (30%) 18 (47%) 9 (56%) 
Medium 155 (39%) 15 (39%) 7 (44%) 
Poor 82 (20%) 4 (11%) 0 
Very poor 43 (11%) 1 (3%) 0 




Major provisions Implementation status in different CFUGs 
Kataharbari Raniswanra Chisapani Manasalu 
Well-being ranking of CFUG 
households 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Preparation and implementation of 
livelihood implementation plan 
No No No No 
Allocation of CF land for income 
generating activities of poor 
No No No No 
Allocation of at least 35% of CFUG 




loan provided  
No No No 
Declaration of kind and cash 
contribution for poor in the annual plan  
No No No No 
Source: Analysis of interview transcriptions, FGDs and CFUG records 
 
In contrast to the pro-poor policy provisions, the well-being ranking and 
categorization of households according to well-being status was also opposed by 
some more well-off interviewees and FGD participants. As one FGD participant 
explained: “we are not in favour of well-being ranking and differential prices of forest 
products for different well-being groups... as the rich have to contribute equally in the 
CF, the price of forest products should be same for all”. A district level government 
official agreed in interview that the policies related to pro-poor resource allocations 
were not under implementation: “the provisions of CF guideline are not implemented 
in most of the CFUGs in this district.  As per the guideline 35% of CF income should 
invest on poverty reduction. But it is not happening in this district”. An annual 
monitoring report of district forest office mentioned that the allocation of annual 
budget for income generation and livelihood improvement activities in 2011 by the 
CFUGs in the district was only two percent of annual income about 9.5 million NRs. 
 
The local elites who were in decision making positions of CFUGs had their own 
understanding of poverty and poor.  The interviewees mentioned that the poor and 
Dalits were poor and vulnerable because of their internal reasons and behaviors 
such as drinking alcohol, laziness and not being aware and worried about their own 
life. The interviewees reported that the local institutions have a limited role in 
improving the livelihoods of poor.  As shared by one of the interviewees in senior 
position of CFUG and other local institutions: “Dalit and poor are poor because of 
their own reason and behaviour. They have to know how to utilize and mobilize 
resources to get out of poverty”. However, very poor and poor interviewees 
described discriminatory practices and exclusion as the major causes pushing them 
below poverty and sustaining injustice. So, it seems that while the government 
adopts a progressive approach in terms of drafting CF guidelines with pro-poor 
provisions, they have not been effective in implementing those policies and 
monitoring their implementation status. 
 
4.2.4 Implementation of governance related provisions 
 
The major governance provisions mentioned in the revised CF guidelines were 
related to participation of all user group members in decision making process, 
transparency in decisions, benefit sharing and financial management, accountability 
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of committee members towards weaker sections of CFUG members, and 
accountability of District Forest Office (DFO) staff in monitoring of CFUGs. Table 4 
presents the implementation status of governance related provisions by CFUGs.  
 
Table 4 Implementation status of governance related provisions according to 





Implementation status in different CFUGs 
Kataharbari Raniswanra Chisapani Manasalu 
Proportionate representation of poor, 
Dalits, women, indigenous nationalities 
in the user committees of CFUG  
No No No No 
Inclusion of committee members from all 
villages (toles) of CFUG households 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organize public audit by all CFUGs at 
least once a year ensuring participation 
of poor, Dalit and women. 
No No No No 
General assembly of the CFUG should 
assign the auditor 
No No No No 
Users’ committee is only allowed to 
spend money according to the annual 
plan approved by general assembly of 
users’ group 
No No No No 
CFUGs should report to DFO and other 
service providers about the progress of 
livelihood improvement program. 
No No No No 
Committee members are considered as 






















Include poor as a new member either 




to some poor 
households 
No No 
Source: Analysis of interview transcriptions, FGDs and CFUG records. 
 
The Table above shows that the CFUGs were not successful in implementing most 
of the governance related provisions. The only provision implemented by all CFUGs 
was the representation of committee members from different clusters or toles of 
CFUG households.  
 
The district level interviewees related to forest office agreed that the mandatory 
policies such as revised community forestry guideline were not implemented by most 
of the CFUGs and the concerned authorities were also not able to implement the 
policies. As mentioned by an interviewee from the district forest office:  
“Community forestry guideline is not implemented by the groups in this 
district....We have 300 community forest user groups in the district and they are 
providing services to about 70 percent of the population in the district. Majority 
of the community forests are passive. The user groups are only active where 
there is an opportunity to get income. The activity of user groups is focused to 
grasp benefits.  There are only 8-10 CFUGs in the district operating according 




The same interviewee further mentioned that the governance of community forestry 
user groups was very weak and many groups were controlled by certain number of 
elites: “40-50 percent CFUGS are run by single man and no other persons than a 
single man knows what is happening. 10-20 percent groups are being managed by 
4-5 persons. There might be only 10 percent CFUGs where there is participation of 
all user group members....In the past, only the government staffs were involved in 
corruption but now user group members are also involved in corruption”. The 
statement indicates that the government office was not capable enough to control 
the elite domination in the community forests and corruption has been further 
institutionalized in the society. 
 
4.2.5 Mediation of external services and benefits  
 
One of the major expected roles of CFUGs, in the context of climate change 
adaptation, is to mediate external services as per the adaptation needs of local 
communities. Interviewees reported that local adaptation needs are multidimensional 
in nature and it is only possible to achieve by coordination of services by many 
organizations. Interviewees who were in executive committee of CFUGs, reported 
that they were able to influence district level government offices, such as forest, 
agriculture, women’s development and soil conservation offices for cash and 
material support in activities such as landslide control, soil conservation and other 
community development activities. Interviewees identified the role of CFUGs in 
approaching and influencing district and national NGOs to bring capacity building 
and income generating activities to their village.  
 
However, in contrast to this opinion, very poor and poor research participants 
claimed that CFUGs as local institutions were even hindering them to get access to 
benefits and services provided by government and other organizations. As reported 
by a very poor interviewee: “there are many government programs in favour of poor 
but the locals don't allow implementing them. The local headmen get benefit, nothing 
for poor. It is all for those who can speak, nothing for voiceless”. Another very poor 
interviewee explained: “government is providing benefits but we can’t get it in the 
village as local institutions don’t support us”. One district level government 
interviewee from the forest office stated that the local elites in key positions of local 
institutions were limiting the access of government officials to poor households with 
pro-poor provisions. As he mentioned: “there is elite domination and poor and 
marginalized are expecting the role of government to implement pro-poor provisions. 
But the elites have political protection….local elites don’t allow government in 
outreaching benefits and services to the poor people”. In contrast to the expected 
role of local institutions in influencing external agencies in favor of poor and 
vulnerable, the CFUGs were blamed as creating obstacles in outreach and benefits 
of services to the poor households. Given the tendency of government and national 
and international aid organizations to implement their programs in rural areas 
through local institutions as implementing partners, the above analysis identifies a 
challenge for external organizations who seek to engage with vulnerable 
communities and support their adaptation needs through the platforms of local 
institutions such as CFUGs. 




The survey data revealed that over 75% of respondents were very satisfied or 
satisfied with the functions and current services of CFUGs. However, 63% of very 
poor and about 28% of poor respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
functions of CFUGs. The satisfaction of respondents with the current roles and 
functions of CFUGs had a significant relationship with their well-being status 
(Pearson’s X2 = 83.1444, df =12, p-value = 0) (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Respondent’s satisfaction with roles and functions of CFUGs 
 











Very satisfied 25 12 2 0 39 (29 %) 
Satisfied 13 31 17 3 64 (48 %) 
Neutral 0 3 2 3 8 (6 %) 
Not satisfied 0 4 8 7 19 (14 %) 
Very dissatisfied 0 0 0 3 3 (2 %) 
Source: Analysis of household survey data 
 
Interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the roles and functions of CFUGs was 
mainly due to contribution of CFUGs in managing and conserving natural resources 
(such as forest, water and soil) and accessing  external services for local benefits. 
As reported by these interviewees, the efforts were successful in promoting 
collective actions and to reduce climate change vulnerability and risks in the 
communities. The very poor and poor interviewees who expressed their 
dissatisfaction claimed the local institutions that were formed by local elites and well-
off for their own interest and the poor had no benefits from the CFUGs.  One of the 
very poor and Dalit interviewees expressed her frustrations with local institutions as 
she realized that benefits from these institutions were always utilized by well-off 
households: “I don't have trust with these institutions. Everything is for rich and there 
is nothing for poor in this village..... All the local institutions are for those who can 
speak. Whatever benefits comes to this village, it is all for those who can speak”. 
The local institutions are made by rich people for their own benefit”. There were 
many stories of this nature expressed by very poor and poor interviewees. The 
frustration expressed by the interviewees was due to various practices and 
behaviors of CFUGs such as exclusion in membership, discrimination in benefit 
sharing and obstacles in access to services and benefits by poor and vulnerable 
communities. 
 
Despite these issues and concerns, very limited efforts were made to improve the 
governance and transformation of CFUGs in favor of poor and vulnerable 
communities. Most of the persons in the decision making positions had their 
connection with political parties and the political connections were also used to gain 
power and to continue impunity. As reported by one of the interviewees affiliated with 
district level forest office: “the local elites who are in key positions of CFUGs have 
political protection. If we do initiate any actions against them the matter goes to 
political party leaders”.      
Although, the functions of CFUGs were supporting collective actions and somehow 
successful in reducing collective vulnerabilities, the actions were not found to be 
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effective in reducing individual vulnerabilities, especially in addressing the 
vulnerabilities of the most vulnerable population. The exclusion and discrimination of 
vulnerable communities from access to and utilization of resources has been 
reported as injustice and a violation of human rights by very poor and poor 
communities.  
 
4.3 Characteristics and functions required in CFUGs to support most 
vulnerable for climate change adaptation 
 
Research participants, in general, recognized that the CFUG could be one of the 
potential institutions to enable local communities for climate change adaptation. 
However, the interviewees also reported changes required in CFUGs in terms of 
institutional characteristics and functions to enable the most vulnerable communities 
for climate change adaptation. The reported characteristics and functions are 
analyzed in different themes as (i) improved governance; (ii) focus on livelihoods 
improvement; (iii) strengthening and leveraging social capital; (iv) contribution in food 
security; (v) reducing disaster risks; (vi) external coordination and linkages; (vii) and 
secured ownership. Table 6 provides a quantification of the number of responses 
under each of these themes, and further categorised for the number of respondents 
in different well-being groups. 
 
Table 6 Changes required in CFUGs to enable climate change adaptation 
 
Changes required in CFUGs to 
enable pro-poor adaptation 
 












Improved governance 58 54 46 83 66 
Focus on livelihoods improvement 57 38 31 50 46 
Strengthening social capital 50 46 23 33 38 
Contribution in food security 25 62 38 17 36 
Reducing disaster risks 42 23 23 25 28 
External coordination and linkages 42 31 8 25 26 
Secured ownership 42 0 8 8 14 
Source: Analysis of interview transcriptions 
 
Not surprisingly, the proposed changes in characteristics and functions of local 
institutions also varied according to the well-being status of the interviewees. Higher 
percentages of very poor and poor interviewees were in favour of improved 
governance, pro-poor and vulnerable focused policies and programs, and solidarity 
and critical mass of poor and vulnerable. On the other hand, the well-off and medium 
interviewees had an interest in enhancing institutional knowledge and capacity for 
climate change adaptation, external linkage and coordination and disaster risk 




The role of CFUGs as local institutions were recognized as having potential to 
contribute to climate change adaptation, based on their authority, role and mandate 
in managing local resources through the mobilization of local communities. Although, 
current understanding, knowledge and capacity of the CFUGs was not adequate, 
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these institutions had a very high potential in analyzing climate vulnerabilities, 
mobilizing local resources and linking local issues to mediate external organizations. 
The findings support the crucial role of CFUGs as a local institution supporting local 
communities on local level adaptation planning and implementation as highlighted by 
previous studies (Agrawal and Perrin 2008).  
 
The knowledge and experience gained by CFUGs in managing common pool 
resources could reduce vulnerabilities, disaster risks and enhance adaptation 
capacity of local communities. However, most of the contributions were targeted at 
reducing collective vulnerabilities of communities with little focus on addressing 
individual vulnerabilities of communities, particularly the most vulnerable. As 
mentioned in the literature (Adger 1999, 2003), the study showed that individual and 
collective vulnerabilities were caused by different factors requiring different strategies 
to address individual and collective vulnerabilities. 
 
The poor and most vulnerable communities lacked trust and ownership of CFUGs as 
local institutions, largely due to exclusion from membership and decision making, 
discrimination in sharing benefits and obstructing and manipulating external services 
targeted to vulnerable communities. As reported, the elites in local institutions were 
promoting and sustaining caste, gender and class based discriminations and 
exclusion of poor and marginalized from access to resources, services and the 
benefit sharing system. Local elites were not in favor of delegating authority and 
power to poorer community members. Unequal power relations and the continued 
dependency of the poor were benefiting local elites and sustaining power 
relationships.  
 
The inequity in participation and benefit sharing based on caste, class and gender 
has been well reported by authors in the similar context (Adhikari and Di Falco 2009; 
Agrawal 2001; Jones and Boyd 2011).  Local institutions represent the society and 
functions as a sub-set of the society. The discriminatory, exclusive and dominant 
practices adopted by the elites in decision making positions of the CFUGs, may not 
be formed by CFUGs themselves. Rather the practices are transferred from the 
society where such practices exist as a legacy of feudal, patriarchal and caste based 
dominations. However, it is not known whether civil society institutions may influence 
the society at large to reduce and end such anomalous practices or whether those 
practices of local institutions may only be reduced through societal influence. 
 
A general trend was observed that the local institutions such as CFUGs were 
increasingly considered as partners of government and donor agencies to implement 
their programs in the communities. The constituency of local institutions and their 
capacity to mobilize and leverage local resources has been considered as their asset 
to achieve the targets of external organizations. This is exhibited by government 
recognition of CFUGs as the key implementing agencies of the national adaptation 
program of action to climate change (MoE 2010, 21). Although the priorities and 
policies of government and donor agencies intend to reach and serve the most 
vulnerable groups, this research finds that the most vulnerable groups are in fact not 
receiving the intended benefits from the CFUGs. This has an implication for the 
ongoing expectations of external agencies of the outcomes of partnerships with 
CFUGs as local institutions. Continuation of such partnership without improving and 
transforming the structure and governance of CFUGs may further disenfranchise 
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poor and vulnerable communities from the benefits of climate change adaptation 
initiatives. 
 
The results showed that the poor and vulnerable communities were not able to 
exercise core human rights such as equality and non-discrimination, participation 
and empowerment, and accountability as guaranteed by international declarations of 
human rights (Evans 2009). Civil society organizations often promote and claim 
justice and human rights of citizens. However, how the members of local institutions 
such as CFUGs claim and exercise their rights and how these rights are respected, 
protected and fulfilled within the framework of civil society managed local institutions 
is not apparent. Changes in the functions and characteristics of CFUGs are 
recommended by communities largely according to their well-being status. The most 
vulnerable communities were in favor of reform in policies, programs and 
governance of local institutions. Conversely, well-off respondents were more 
engaged in how local institutions could become more technically competent in 





The role of CFUGs as local institutions has been explored in terms of the ability to 
enable vulnerable communities to adapt when faced with increasing difficulties from 
the impacts of climate change. The research revealed that CFUGs were well 
established in the research sites and relatively successful in managing local 
resources as common property and in reducing collective vulnerability in the context 
of climate change. Involvement of CFUGs in designing, implementing and 
coordinating climate change adaptation related activities is an additional 
responsibility demanded by communities. CFUGs as local institutions are considered 
by external agencies to be the most appropriate entry point to access the poor 
through pro-poor initiative and hence become partners in adaption programs. 
Analysis of institutional capacity and governance of CFUGs from the perspectives of 
the most vulnerable was found to be an important consideration when informing 
policy and practice. Climate change adaptation in rural and remote hills of Nepal is 
occurring, and the roles, responsibilities and challenges of local institutions are 
expected to change to meet the expectations. Enhancing understanding knowledge 
and skills on impacts of climate vulnerabilities as well as selection and 
implementation of appropriate adaptation measures are areas of improvement for 
CFUGs. More importantly, how CFUGs improve their internal governance and 
delegate authority and power to the most vulnerable and poor will increasingly 
challenge the system of governance. Transformation in structure, governance and 
the attitudes of decision makers in CFUGs is required to build trust and to equitably 
equip most vulnerable communities to enable them in climate change adaptation.  
Transformation is also required at agency and government level in the 
implementation and monitoring of outcomes of policies and programs to enhance 
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